Meanwhile, Beijing has also gravitated toward the notion of “indivisible security,” which posits that nations shouldn’t enhance their security at the expense of others — a doctrine promoted by Moscow for decades, and a criticism aimed at NATO’s activities. Prior to the invasion, China had endorsed the concept in joint statements with Russia. But since then, it’s been included in the Global Security Initiative — a cornerstone of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for international relations — which suggests it will enjoy a more prominent role in Chinese foreign policy.
The pair also share a disdain for Western sanctions — including those imposed on Russia. Chinese officials vehemently oppose American “illegal unilateral sanctions” and say they won’t comply with them. And Xi hasn’t just passively resisted efforts to isolate Russia, providing the country with an economic lifeline, he’s also shown he’s willing to bear both reputational and economic costs to support his neighbor.
Since 2022, China’s leaders have dealt with a serious economic downturn, the sudden and unexplained ousting of two cabinet ministers and growing Western resistance to its global ambitions. The war has only amplified these challenges, with China’s relations with Europe tarnished by Beijing’s support for Moscow. And while China’s been wary of openly violating Western sanctions, multiple Chinese companies have recently been subject to restrictions for trading with Russian counterparts.
But this seems to be a sacrifice Xi is willing to make. In fact, as the West has increased its demands on China, it’s bond with Russia appears to have only strengthened. Trade and defense exchanges have grown significantly, while the Russian people seem to have become more positively disposed toward China too.
The longer China maintains its pro-Russian stance, the harder all this will be to reverse. Chinese firms have already adapted their operations to cater to expanding trade relations with Russia. Over time, this structural change will become harder and more expensive to undo. Moreover, Xi’s support of Putin has been personal and highly publicized. And as China’s pro-Russian policies don’t enjoy universal support among Chinese intellectuals, a policy reversal could be seen as a concession to his critics.
After his meeting with Xi in April, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the two leaders had agreed to “coordinate intensively” on holding peace conferences regarding Ukraine. And he made it clear he thinks “China’s word carries weight in Russia.”
It’s true a mediator doesn’t have to be perfectly impartial to be successful. With decisive leverage over one or both conflicting parties, it can cajole them into making compromises that might otherwise be impossible. For such efforts to be successful, however, said mediator must be willing to lean on the dependent parties in a way that can significantly strain its relations with them. So far, Xi has shown no signs of willingness to do so — and the chances of that seem to be decreasing.
European leaders are right to maintain a dialogue with China and to continue demanding Xi uses his leverage. But until China does so, letting Beijing take on a major role in the peace process risks legitimizing the invasion.
Abhinav Thawait is a globe-trotting correspondent with a passion for international affairs. With a background in international relations, he offers a global perspective on the most pressing issues around the world. Abhinav’s curiosity takes his to the far corners of the earth, where he seeks to share untold stories and diverse viewpoints.
