Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2024

Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 29, 2024, 6pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on June 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Two prominent Russian officials appear to be spearheading divergent paths for addressing religious extremism in Russia as ethnic and religious tension in Russia continues to rise. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin commented on the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan and claimed on June 29 that Islamic terrorists were “able to carry their banner of Islamic terror” into Russia and that the State Duma must respond to the threat of Islamic terrorists in Russia.[1] Bastrykin’s indictment of Islamists prompted backlash from Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, who urged Bastrykin and other Russian officials to choose their words carefully and avoid characterizing all Muslims as terrorists.[2] Kadyrov warned that such statements threaten the unity and stability of Russia’s socio-political situation. Russian milbloggers and lower-level Russian officials have previously participated in similar debates, and it is significant that Kadyrov was willing to openly criticize another high-level Kremlin official on this issue.[3] Bastrykin has previously positioned himself as a prominent figure in Russia’s ultranationalist movement and is placing himself at odds with Kadyrov, who often presents himself as a representative of Russia’s Muslim minority.[4] Putin previously attempted to quell concerns within the Russian information space about the threat posed by migrant and Muslim communities following the Crocus City Hall attack on March 22 by simultaneously calling for unspecified changes to Russia’s migration policy and denouncing Islamophobia and xenophobia.[5] Putin may weigh in on Bastrykin’s and Kadyrov’s debate in the coming days in hopes of similarly quelling concern among Russians and a possible future conflict between Bastrykin and Kadyrov.

Russian ultranationalists continue to express growing doubt in Russian authorities’ ability to prevent another terrorist attack and to address ethnic and religious tensions within Russia following the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan. Russian ultranationalists widely circulated a story alleging that extremists harassed a Russian doctor in Dagestan who refused to see a patient who would not remove her niqab (a long garment worn by some Muslim women to cover their entire body and face, excluding their eyes) and claimed that extremist actors orchestrated the event to incite further ethnic and religious tensions within Dagestan.[6] Russian ultranationalists also claimed that Dagestani officials know the identities of extremist thought leaders but have allowed radical Salafi-Jihadists to control entire spheres of public life within the republic.[7] These claims led to renewed discussions about banning niqab in Russia, which prompted Bastrykin to voice indirect support for banning the style of dress.[8] Select Western and Muslim-majority countries have imposed various statutes banning religious dress and garments that cover one’s face, although the Russian ultranationalist discussion focusing on niqab is strange given the scarcity of Muslims wearing niqab in Russia. The Russian ultranationalist preoccupation with the niqab appears to be a talking point for ultranationalists to express their perception of an extremist threat emanating from Russia’s Muslim-minority communities and to criticize Russian authorities for not doing enough to prevent what ultranationalists consider to be inevitable future terrorist attacks.[9] Russian ultranationalists will likely continue to express their fears about further terrorist attacks in ways that further inflame ethnic and religious tension, and ISW continues to assess that Russian ultranationalist rhetoric is partially alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.[10]

Ten Ukrainian civilians whom Russian and Belarusian authorities arrested and held in captivity or prison, including individuals detained before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, returned to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 29 that 10 Ukrainian civilians returned to Ukraine from Russian and Belarusian captivity as part of the 53rd prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange that Ukrainian officials initially announced on June 25.[11] Ukrainian officials stated that among the returned civilians were First Deputy Head of the Crimean Tatar Majlis Nariman Dzhelyal, whom Russian authorities arrested in 2021; two Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church priests, whom Russian authorities arrested in occupied Berdyansk in 2022; five Ukrainian citizens, whom Belarusian authorities arrested in Belarus; and two Ukrainian civilians, whom Russian authorities detained in occupied Donetsk Oblast in 2017.[12] Zelensky stated that the Vatican mediated the return of the 10 Ukrainian civilians.[13] Ukrainian and Russian officials have not commented on whether Russia received civilians or POWs in exchange for these 10 Ukrainian civilians.

Key Takeaways:

• Two prominent Russian officials appear to be spearheading divergent paths for addressing religious extremism in Russia as ethnic and religious tension in Russia continues to rise.
• Russian ultranationalists continue to express growing doubt in Russian authorities’ ability to prevent another terrorist attack and to address ethnic and religious tensions within Russia following the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan.
• Ten Ukrainian civilians whom Russian and Belarusian authorities arrested and held in captivity or prison, including individuals detained before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, returned to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Donetsk City.
• Some new Russian military personnel are reportedly receiving insufficient training before deploying to Ukraine.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Fighting continued near and within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) on June 28 and 29.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) and that Russian forces destroyed an unspecified crossing over the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[15] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that some Russian soldiers operating in the Vovchansk direction, particularly soldiers of the 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), are refusing to fight.[16] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating within the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.[17] Ukrainian officials recently reported on June 16 and 23 that Russian forces attempted to withdraw elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade that became combat-ineffective after suffering high losses in the Kharkiv direction.[18]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna amid continued fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 28 and 29. Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a railway line south of Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[19] Additional geolocated footage published on June 28 and 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna) and within a forest area southwest of Kreminna.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced roughly one kilometer in depth southeast of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and seized positions north of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from forested areas east of Myasozharivka (west of Svatove) and advanced to the administrative borders of the settlement.[22] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Nevske (southwest of Svatove).[23] A Ukrainian serviceman operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are using drones to drop chemical munitions, incendiary substances, gases, and poisonous substances on Ukrainian positions in this direction.[24] Russian forces continued assaults southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Stelmakhivka, and Kruhlyakivka; southwest of Svatove near Makiivka and Hrekivka; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 28 and 29.[25]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Airborne Division) recently seized Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) and that Russian forces are advancing toward Pereizne (south of Siversk and north of Rozdolivka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[26] Russian forces continued attacks south of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka on June 29.[27] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne Regiment (106th VDV Division) are also reportedly operating near Pereizne.[28]

Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 29. Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced within the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forest area south of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[30] Fighting continued near Chasiv Yar, Kalynivka, and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on June 29.[31] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[32]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on June 29. Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced up to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal east of Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Shumy (southeast of Toretsk) as of June 29, although Russian and Ukrainian sources began claiming that Russian forces seized the settlement on June 22.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Pivnichne and Zalizne (both southeast of Toretsk) and advanced up to 2.3 kilometers deep and 1.65 kilometers wide on the outskirts of Pivdenne (southeast of Toretsk).[35] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Pivnichne, and southeast of Toretsk near Pivdenne and Niu York.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Avdiivka on June 29, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka) and advanced to the western outskirts of Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka).[37] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the outskirts of Sokil.[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[39] A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using high-speed motorcycles in the Pokrovsk direction (Avdiivka direction) in unsuccessful attempts to bypass Ukrainian defenses.[40] Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Novoselivka Persha, and Sokil and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka and Karlivka on June 29.[41]

 

Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 29. Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southwestern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[42] Additional geolocated footage published on June 29 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[43] A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson stated on June 28 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a roughly reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City).[44] The brigade spokesperson stated that Russian forces used nine tanks and nine armored vehicles in the assault and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and damaged four others, including some T-90 tanks. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Maksymilyanivka (west of Donetsk City).[45] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City within Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on June 29.[46] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Maksymilyanivka.[47]

 

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine on June 29.[48] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (subordinate to the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporzhia Oblast on June 29. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) and  Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on June 29.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupied strongholds near Robotyne.[51] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are struggling to detect and suppress Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones as Ukrainian forces have changed the drones’ frequencies.[52] Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[53]

 

Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian diesel train with FPV drones near Tokmak.[54]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on June 29.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are small arms battles in the island zone near the Antonivsky railway and road bridges (north of Poyma and Oleshky, respectively).[56] The milblogger claimed that Russian military authorities claimed that Russian forces took complete control of the entire island zone, but Russian frontline soldiers refuted these reports. Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 52nd Airborne (VDV) Artillery Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[57]

 

Russian officials and milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unspecified missile strike against occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on June 29 and that missile fragments fell on private homes.[58]

Russian Air, Missile, and 10ampaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 28 to 29. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 drones over Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia oblasts.[59] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on June 28 purporting to show Russian forces striking a Ukrainian S-300 air defense system near Velykodolynske, Odesa Oblast with an unspecified type of Iskander missile.[60]

Ukrainian energy enterprises continue to report that previous Russian strikes have significantly constrained Ukraine’s energy grid. The CEO of private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK, Ildar Saleev, stated on June 29 that previous Russian strikes have taken 90 percent of DTEK’s energy generation capacity offline and that DTEK will repair damaged thermal power plants (TPPs) over the course of years.[61] The CEO of Ukrainian private energy enterprise YASNO, Serhii Kovalenko, stated on June 29 that Ukraine will likely face a 30 percent electricity deficit in Winter 2024-2025 and that scheduled emergency power outages could last for weeks in the winter.[62]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Some new Russian military personnel are reportedly receiving insufficient training before deploying to Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that new Russian personnel receive roughly 14 days of training on average before deploying to the frontline.[63] The milblogger noted that new Russian personnel receives four to five days of real training and that the 14 days encompass the time between signing a military contract and arriving at the front in Ukraine.[64] A former Storm-Z instructor agreed with the milblogger’s assessment and bemoaned problems with general training.[65] The milblogger also noted that an average Ukrainian soldier appears to receive much more training than the average Russian soldier.[66] The Russian military is currently committing all Russian forces, regardless of their formal designations, to more or less similar operations along the front and continues to mainly leverage mass in infantry and occasional mechanized assaults to make creeping advances instead of relying on highly trained units.[67] This decision has likely lowered training requirements for most new Russian personnel set to fight in Ukraine, although 14 days is still insufficient for generating even limited combat effective personnel.  While many new Russian personnel may receive inadequate training, Russian forces likely provide Russian personnel with further training following deployment to Ukraine and are likely attempting to offer better training for select elements.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the US State Department’s 2023 International Religious Freedom report on Russia on June 28 and denied the veracity of the report as part of ongoing Russian informational efforts to present Russia as a unified multireligious and multiethnic country.[68] The State Department’s 2023 report on religious freedom in Russia and Ukraine details Russian authorities’ repression of religious minorities in Russia and occupied Ukraine, which is consistent with ISW’s reporting on the issue.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on June 28 that Belarusian and Russian propagandists are falsely presenting Ukraine as a threat to Belarus.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 29 that Russia must be prepared to defend Belarus against Ukrainian aggression and that Russia could preemptively destroy Kyiv City with glide bombs or other unspecified weapons in order to protect Belarus.[71] Russian forces would have to operate Russian aircraft at the international border or within Ukrainian airspace in order to strike Kyiv City with glide bombs. Belarusian military officials claimed that there have been no provocations along the Ukraine-Belarus border since an alleged drone strike into Belarus by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces on June 26 and presented Belarusian forces as well-prepared to address any possible threat from Ukraine.[72] The Belarusian State Border Committee claimed on June 28 that Belarusian forces shot down an alleged drone from the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) near the Ukraine-Belarus border in Gomel Oblast on June 26.[73]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/29/06/2024/667fd4c59a794736547a8cd3 

[2] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4879

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824

[6]   https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71440 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47591 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20264 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17919 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17921 

[7] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71440 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47591 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20264 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17919 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17921

[8] https://t.me/dva_majors/46381  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71474 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/29/06/2024/667fd4c59a794736547a8cd3 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71440 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47591 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20264 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17919 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17921  

[9] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71440 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47591 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20264 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17919 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17921  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://www.facebook.com/watch/zelenskyy.official/?ref=embed_video ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/6777 ; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-uchasnikiv-nacionalnogo-mo-91873 ; https://suspilne dot media/779707-pid-cas-obminu-polonenimi-z-rf-v-ukrainu-vdalosa-povernuti-dvoh-svasennikiv-zelenskij/ ; https://suspilne dot media/779749-zelenskij-zustrivsa-iz-dzelalom-akogo-rosiani-utrimuvali-u-poloni-z-2021-roku/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/zavershyvsia-53-i-obmin—z-rosiiskoi-nevoli-vyzvoleni-politychni-brantsi-kremlia-ta-nezakonno-zasudzheni-ukraintsi.html

[12] https://t.me/astrapress/58537; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/6777; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-uchasnikiv-nacionalnogo-mo-91873; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/35058

[13] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/6777; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-ukrayini-do-uchasnikiv-nacionalnogo-mo-91873

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XWNFBEPPKsbYa2D7SM3AXkz2ARUvgPjUDDRmMNWjkJZqtuPauFe2tLrKh6ABn7u4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vr8stiyppwMeTLKJSDdo1PLDgHBfvQTKMNDocxqeMpWkkBnqZtXpCokiZs4xWVNul ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20774; https://t.me/dva_majors/46364; https://t.me/rybar/61374

[15] https://t.me/dva_majors/46364; https://t.me/rybar/61374; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71458

[16] https://www.youtube.com/live/hf29n-2E9nk?si=4hQrY7wxbkaDZvHJ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/29/poblyzu-vovchanska-rosijski-shturmovyky-vidmovlyayutsya-vykonuvaty-zavdannya/

[17] https://t.me/khornegroup/2203 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1806753591777984919; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/29/smertelna-pastka-dlya-rusni-u-vovchansku-dron-z-protytankovoyu-minoyu-strim-iz-pryfrontovogo-mista/

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024

[19] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5931; https://t.me/ssternenko/30439; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1807006730468925935; https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1806958507989561813

[20] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5927; https://t.me/BARS011/12120 ; https://t.me/ombr_63/722 ; https://x.com/foosint/status/1806762335891013682 ; https://x.com/foosint/status/1806762339368067098   

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12271  

[22] https://t.me/rybar/61367   

[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71446 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27158   ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128350?single

[24] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/29/na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-aktyvno-zastosovuyut-otrujni-gazy/   

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XWNFBEPPKsbYa2D7SM3AXkz2ARUvgPjUDDRmMNWjkJZqtuPauFe2tLrKh6ABn7u4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vr8stiyppwMeTLKJSDdo1PLDgHBfvQTKMNDocxqeMpWkkBnqZtXpCokiZs4xWVNul  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/46364; https://t.me/rybar/61374 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71446 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24371   

[26] https://t.me/rybar/61379 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24359

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl

[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71432

[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5930; https://t.me/igorgrouppp/32

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12274 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27156 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37226

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20774 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/46364

[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128314

[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5924; https://t.me/rubpak28/242; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27153; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128350; https://t.me/motopatriot/24376

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/40434 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024

[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27153 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128350 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71446

[36] https://t.me/rybar/61395 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl  

[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27155 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24374 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71470

[38] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18243 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18248 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57282

[39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27155

[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/28/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-perejshov-do-taktyky-motoczykly-v-odyn-kinecz/

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XWNFBEPPKsbYa2D7SM3AXkz2ARUvgPjUDDRmMNWjkJZqtuPauFe2tLrKh6ABn7u4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57282 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24370

[42] https://t.me/rybar/61363; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5925; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/596

[43] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1806990315384963473 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1806990839874253144; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/606; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5929; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=707250541494256

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/28/na-kurahivskomu-napryamku-vorog-namagayetsya-atakuvaty-bronovanymy-kulakamy/

[45] https://t.me/rybar/61363

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18243 ; https://t.me/rybar/61363 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12262 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20774

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71453 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12436

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12279

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/9419; https://t.me/voin_dv/9426; https://t.me/voin_dv/9428

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XWNFBEPPKsbYa2D7SM3AXkz2ARUvgPjUDDRmMNWjkJZqtuPauFe2tLrKh6ABn7u4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Q74ZNYXKuMLwxP97qMLw21iCao3vvj7YZE6jCqg4PyG8buN154e6qv3VhTPUzCKhl; https://t.me/wargonzo/20774; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71446

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/46364; https://t.me/rybar/61374

[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/46364; https://t.me/rybar/61374

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71465

[54] https://t.me/andriyshTime/23891; https://t.me/EjShahidenko/2974 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24372  

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjBAnkQ4HgYwtYHKKSHzLxN6bEQnGzAQAGkxvo7P1qpEcEhLFcF9WvgyogpCVbQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vr8stiyppwMeTLKJSDdo1PLDgHBfvQTKMNDocxqeMpWkkBnqZtXpCokiZs4xWVNul ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0268DQyGZQuPgsgfV3Fch5LdVm9yQ9KTunJHDE8sxofbVoRhqy8MAZV9LsgLKptNbGl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10211  

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/46364; https://t.me/rybar/61374

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128348 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37210; https://t.me/dva_majors/46374

[58] https://t.me/treugolniklpr/41768 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/46369  ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/6981 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/6983 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71451

[59] https://t.me/ComAFUA/323 

[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/40417; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71424 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/125004  

[61] https://suspilne dot media/779379-dtek-vtrativ-90-potuznostej-odnak-vsi-obekti-pidlagaut-vidnovlennu-gendirektor-kompanii/

[62] https://t.me/uniannet/137976 ; https://english.nv dot ua/business/lengthy-power-cuts-unavoidable-this-winter-yasno-ceo-50429220.html

[63] https://t.me/vault8pro/51389 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1806876916722311448  ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1071 

[64] https://t.me/vault8pro/51389 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1806876916722311448 

[65] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1071 

[66] https://t.me/vault8pro/51389 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1806876916722311448 

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324

[68] https://t.me/tass_agency/257728   

[69] https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/russia/   ; https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ukraine/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[70] https://cpd dot gov.ua/en/results/anti-ukrainian-propaganda-in-belarus-piotr-petrovsky/

[71] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18246   ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37220   

[72] https://t.me/tass_agency/257824 ; https://t.me/modmilby/39911    ; https://t.me/modmilby/39906  ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/255537 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/255538; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/255539 

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024 ; https://gpk.gov dot by/news/gpk/162115/